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SUMMARY
Out-of-pocket (OOP) payments are the principal means of financing health care throughout much of Asia. We
estimate the magnitude and distribution of OOP payments for health care in fourteen countries and territories
accounting for 81% of the Asian population. We focus on payments that are catastrophic, in the sense of severely
disrupting household living standards, and approximate such payments by those absorbing a large fraction of
household resources. Bangladesh, China, India, Nepal and Vietnam rely most heavily on OOP financing and have
the highest incidence of catastrophic payments. Sri Lanka, Thailand and Malaysia stand out as low to middle
income countries that have constrained both the OOP share of health financing and the catastrophic impact of
direct payments. In most low/middle-income countries, the better-off are more likely to spend a large fraction of
total household resources on health care. This may reflect the inability of the poorest of the poor to divert resources
from other basic needs and possibly the protection of the poor from user charges offered in some countries. But in
China, Kyrgyz and Vietnam, where there are no exemptions of the poor from charges, they are as, or even more,
likely to incur catastrophic payments. Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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INTRODUCTION
Out-of-pocket payments are the principal means of financing health care throughout much of Asia
(O’Donnell et al., 2005). This has consequences for the utilisation of health care and subsequently
nCorrespondence to: Department of Health Policy and Management, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands.
E-mail: vandoorslaer@few.eur.nl
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health. There are also potentially important consequences for household living standards. Welfare is
reduced by the uncertainty of medical expenditures. Households may be able to borrow to cover
unexpected medical bills but at the risk of being trapped in long-term debt. As a result, opportunities to
escape poverty through investments in human capital may be lost. Where there is a lack of access to
credit, a characteristic of less-developed economies particularly binding for the financing of investments
in health, medical expenses must be covered from the current household budget and from wealth. Some
households might be able to finance medical expenses from savings, by selling assets or by cutting back
on expendable items of consumption. More severely economically constrained households may be
forced to cut back on necessities and consequently be pushed into poverty. Illness then presents a
difficult choice between diverting a large fraction of household resources to cover the costs of treatment
and forgoing treatment at the expense of health.
The threat that out-of-pocket (OOP) payments pose to household living standards is increasingly
recognised as a major consideration in the financing of health care (Commission on Macroeconomics
and Health, 2001; OECD and WHO, 2003; World Bank, 2004; World Health Organisation, 2005). The
extent to which such concern is justified depends upon the unpredictability of OOP payments, their
magnitude relative to household resources and their distribution in relation to that of income. We
describe the magnitude and distribution of OOP payments for health care in fourteen countries and
territories that account for 81% of the total population of Asia (49% of the world population). Our
focus is on expenditures that are catastrophic, in the sense that they severely disrupt household living
standards. Following others (Berki, 1986; Wyszewianski, 1986; Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 2003;
Xu et al., 2003; Russell, 2004), we approximate such catastrophic payments by those in excess of a
substantial fraction of the household budget. Spending a large fraction of household resources on health
care can threaten living standards either in the short term, as current consumption of other goods and
services must be sacrificed, or in the long term, as assets are divested, savings depleted or debt
accumulated. One conception of fairness in health finance is that households should be protected
against such catastrophic medical expenses (World Health Organisation, 2000).
Most previous estimates of the impact of OOP payments on living standards in developing countries
have relied on data from small-scale health surveys that are not nationally representative, often being
restricted to rural areas (Sauerbron et al., 1995; Ensor and Pham, 1996; Sauerbron et al., 1996;
Pannarunothai and Mills, 1997; Wilkes et al., 1998; Fabricant et al., 1999; Ranson, 2002; Segall et al.,
2002; Skarbinski et al., 2002; Russell, 2004; van Damme, 2004). We analyse data from nationally
representative household expenditure surveys that record both OOP payments for health care and total
household expenditure in detail and so offer accurate estimates of the magnitude of OOP payments
relative to the household budget. We extend the existing evidence on catastrophic payments derived
from nationally representative expenditure data (Pradhan and Prescott, 2002; Wagstaff and Van
Doorslaer, 2003; Xu et al., 2003) by adding estimates for China and India, and many other Asian
countries.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Next, we provide background information on the financing
contribution and composition of OOP payments and on public health care charging policy in each of
the fourteen study territories. Then we summarise the magnitude and distribution of OOP payments
relative to household budgets. Further, the extent to which OOP payments for health care are
catastrophic is examined. Finally, we summarise and interpret the main findings, and acknowledge some
limitations.
OUT-OF-POCKET FINANCING OF HEALTH CARE IN ASIA
The fourteen territories included in the analysis span the whole range of economic development from
low to high income (Table I). In each case, OOP payments fund at least 30%, and often much more, of
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total expenditure on health (Table I). Poorer countries rely more heavily on direct payments. The OOP
contribution reaches three-quarters or more of total expenditure on health (THE) in Nepal, India and
Vietnam. OOP financing has been reduced in Hong Kong, Malaysia and Thailand by greater reliance on
taxation and in Taiwan and South Korea through the development of universal social insurance. In
Korea, heavy use of co-payments means that one half of TEH is still financed directly out-of-pocket.
Our analysis is based on OOP payments reported in household expenditure or socio-economic
surveys. Details of the surveys are given in Table AI of Appendix A. OOP payments include fees,
insurance co-payments, user charges for public care and purchases of medicines, appliances, diagnostic
tests, etc (see Table III). Expenditures on both Western and traditional care are included. The shares of
total OOP payments that are for public sector care and the percentages of the total on inpatient,
ambulatory, medicines and other types of care are given in Table I. In some cases it is not possible to
make this disaggregation since the survey asks only for total OOP payments for health care.
In Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, only a tiny fraction of OOP payments are for care delivered in the
public sector. In Sri Lanka, care in the public sector is free, with the rather peculiar exception of family
planning (Table II). In Bangladesh, most primary care is free and there is only a nominal registration
charge for inpatient and outpatient care in secondary facilities. There are charges for inpatient care at
major public hospitals but the poor and civil servants are exempt (Table II). In principle, medicines are
free within facilities but in practice most medicines must be purchased from drug outlets. This, in
addition to the widespread use of unqualified providers of modern and traditional medicine, accounts
for the low share of total OOP payments that is for public sector care in Bangladesh (Data International
Ltd., 2004). Public sector charges constitute a very modest share of total OOP payments in Hong Kong,
where charges are made for inpatient and outpatient care but at a very moderate level and with
exemptions for the poor, civil servants and health service staff (Table II). Malaysia is similar but with
less exemptions for the poor. By contrast, payments for care received in the public sector account for
around a quarter of total OOP payments in India and Indonesia and more than a third in Thailand and
Vietnam and more than two-fifths in Kyrgyz (Table I).1 There are user charges for virtually all public
sector medical care and medicines in Indonesia. This is also the case in Thailand but since the 2001
universal coverage reform there has been a flat charge equivalent to around 70 US cents per day.
Charges are levied for all public sector care in Vietnam, with the exception of outpatient care at health
centres (Table II). In India, primary care delivered at some or all facilities is free, at least in principle.
The same is true in Kyrgyz and the Philippines and there is a 60% subsidy for care at health posts and
primary care centres in Nepal. There are no charges for vaccinations, immunisations and family
planning services in Bangladesh, China, India, Malaysia, Nepal, Taiwan and Thailand. Consultations
with hospital specialists are free only in India and Kyrgyz.
Exemptions of the poor from public sector user charges and co-payments in Bangladesh, Hong Kong,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam may reduce the
impoverishing effect of such charges. But this depends upon the implementation of fee waivers. There
are known problems with implementation in Bangladesh, Nepal, and the Philippines, often because
shortage of medicines means that they must be paid for. In Indonesia and Thailand, charges are levied
on most medical services but effective health card systems help to shield the poor (Khoman, 1997;
Saadah et al., 2001). In India, subsidisation of the poor works indirectly, through price discrimination.
The poor can opt for lower quality but cheaper inpatient care on separate wards. This arrangement also
operates in Indonesia. Informally, the poor or those considered unable to pay are likely to be exempted
from charges in parts of India, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Kyrgyz and Thailand exempt both children and
the elderly from charges. The elderly are exempt in the Philippines and pay a reduced co-payment in
Korea.
1Payments for medicines prescribed at public sector facilities are included.
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Comparing shares of OOP payments for inpatient care, ambulatory care and medicines is difficult
given differences across surveys in the categorisation of expenditures. For this reason, we do not attempt
to compare catastrophic payments due to different categories of expenditure. Nonetheless, the estimates
presented in Table I reveal some consistencies in the composition of OOP payments that deserve
comment. There are also some cross-country differences that do not seem spurious but reflections of
differences in environment and policy. In general, inpatient care does not absorb the largest share of
OOP payments. More is spent out-of-pocket on ambulatory care and on medicines. If this were not the
case, the catastrophic impact of OOP payments would be greater since they would be concentrated on a
fewer number of households receiving inpatient care. South Korea is the one exception, where 40% of
OOP payments are for inpatient care. This is to be expected given that social insurance covers only
30–40% of the costs of inpatient care (Table II). In contrast, there is 90–95% coverage of inpatient costs
in Taiwan and, as a result, only 10% of OOP payments are for inpatient care.
The share of total OOP payments that goes on medicines is generally larger in the poorer, more rural
countries. The share is 70% or more in Bangladesh, India and Vietnam. This is consistent with the
greater prevalence of self-medication in poorer and particularly rural societies in which access to health
services is constrained by income and distance (Chang and Trivedi, 2003). Self-medication, which often
has little or no positive effect on health, is a recognised problem in South Asia (Mudur, 1999). Arguably,
absorption of constrained household budgets by payments for medication is even more catastrophic
when there is so little return in terms of health. But the entire OOP share attributed to medicines is not
due to self-treatment. It includes medicines prescribed during treatment but purchased by the patient
separately. In Bangladesh and Vietnam, the OOP shares on medicines are 70 and 88%, respectively,
when all expenditures on medicines are included – those prescribed during treatment and not. When
payments for prescribed medicines are included with the respective inpatient and ambulatory
expenditures, the share of OOP spent on medicines, which is due to self-medication, is only 6.3% in
Bangladesh and 37% in Vietnam. Nonetheless, spending on drugs, prescribed or not, generally accounts
for a very large fraction of OOP payments. Drug pricing and charging policy, but also utilisation
practices, deserve particular consideration in formulating policies to limit the impact of health care
payments on household welfare.
HOUSEHOLD BUDGET SHARES OF OUT-OF-POCKET PAYMENTS
The incidence of catastrophic payments, defined as payments in excess of a threshold budget share,
depends upon the location and dispersion of the distribution of OOP payments relative to household
resources. Before presenting measures of catastrophic payments, we examine the OOP budget shares
distributions. For low- and middle-income countries, the household budget is defined as the value of
consumption, including that from home production (see Table III). For the high-income territories
(Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea), the household budget is given by expenditure on market goods
and services. Each survey contains detailed data on OOP payments for health care, covering at least
payments for inpatient care, outpatient care and medicines (Table III). These data are potentially
subject to both recall bias and small sample bias due to the infrequency with which some health care
payments are made. Longer recall periods should reduce bias through infrequency of purchase but at
the cost of increasing recall bias. Survey estimates of aggregate health care payments tend to show
discrepancies from production-side estimates, where the latter are available. There also tend to be
discrepancies, at times substantial, between estimates of total private expenditure obtained from surveys
and from national accounts procedures (Deaton, 2004). In the present context, there is a problem if
measurement error in OOP payments for health care differs substantially from that in other items of
expenditure. It is very difficult to verify whether this is the case and there is little option but to rely on
the expenditure survey estimates of the OOP budget share.
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There is substantial variation across territories in the mean OOP budget share (Table IV). Averaged
across all households, OOP payments for health care absorb 4–5.5% of total household consumption in
China, India, Bangladesh and Vietnam. All four of these countries rely on OOP payments for at least
60% of health financing. With the exception of (urban) China, they are among the poorest countries
examined here. Associated with poverty, population health deficiencies drive up expenditures on health
care and medicines. The mean OOP budget share is much lower – 1.4–2.7% – in Malaysia, Thailand,
Indonesia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Hong Kong, Kyrgyz and Nepal. With the exceptions of
Indonesia, Kyrgyz and Nepal, these countries are less poor than the first group and rely less heavily on
OOP financing. The low mean OOP budget shares in Indonesia and Nepal, despite their heavy reliance
on OOP financing, indicate low aggregate levels of spending on health care. This reflects the severity of
poverty and the prioritisation of subsistence needs. In the two high-income territories operating a social
insurance model with co-payments – Korea and Taiwan – the mean OOP budget share is in the middle
of the range, around 3.8%. The lower average budget share in Hong Kong (2.3%) is understandable
given its higher levels of income and population health and, in comparison with Korea, its lower
reliance on OOP financing.
Within each territory, there is a great deal of variation in the OOP budget share across households,
suggesting that OOP payments are highly unpredictable. With the exceptions of India, Kyrgyz, Taiwan
and Vietnam, the standard deviation of the share is at least 1.9 times the mean. This coefficient of
variation is greatest in the four countries with the smallest mean shares – Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia
and the Philippines. The distributions are all highly right-skewed with the mean twice the median or
more in all cases but for Taiwan, China and Vietnam. Using the median as measure of central tendency,
Taiwan is among the territories with the highest OOP budget shares. This, together with the relatively
limited variance and skewness in Taiwan, is explained by high rates of utilisation (O’Donnell et al.,
2005), extensive co-payments for most services but high insurance coverage of inpatient care. It is less
clear why the distribution is relatively dense in Vietnam. A possible explanation is that the extensive
practice of self-medication gives rise to consistently high OOP payments (Chang and Trivedi 2003).
With the exceptions of China and Taiwan, concentration indices of OOP budget shares are positive,
indicating that the better-off spend a larger fraction of their resources on health care. This can also be
observed in the quintile specific means of the OOP budget share. The gradient is steepest in Bangladesh,
the Philippines, Indonesia and India. In Bangladesh, the richest fifth of households, on average, spend
almost 9% of the household budget on health care, while the poorest fifth spend less than 3%.
Bangladesh, India and Indonesia are among the poorest countries included in the study. The most
plausible explanation of the steep income gradients in these countries is that the better-off can respond
to health problems with the purchase of medical care and medicines, while the poorest of the poor
cannot afford to divert resources from other pressing demands on very constrained budgets. However,
one should not overlook the fact that the poorest households in Bangladesh – a very poor country –
spend a larger fraction of their available resources on health care than the richest households in high-
income Hong Kong. This is explained by the tremendous differences in population health and insurance
coverage. China and Vietnam are similar to Bangladesh and India in having a high mean OOP budget
share but differ in that the distribution does not display a steep income gradient. In China, the rich
actually spend relatively less out-of-pocket on health care. A consequence, one might suppose, of the
lack of any fee exemptions for the poor, the collapse of collective payment schemes in rural areas and
the greater health insurance cover enjoyed by the better-off, urban population (Henderson et al., 1995;
Bloom and Gu, 1997; Carrin et al., 1997; Akin et al., 2004). Fee waivers exist in Vietnam but, at the time
of the survey, were restricted to the indigent identified by village committees (Table II). Hong Kong
appears to shield the poor better from charges than the social insurance systems of Korea and Taiwan.
Our finding that the OOP budget share is most often increasing with the household budget is
inconsistent with the common assertion that the poor spend proportionately more out-of-pocket on
health care in low-income countries (Whitehead et al., 2001). The evidence cited to support this
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assertion is not from nationally representative expenditure surveys but from health surveys conducted in
one, usually rural, region (Ensor and Pham, 1996; Pannarunothai and Mills, 1997; Fabricant et al.,
1999; Segall et al., 2002).2 Such surveys ignore payments made by the better-off urban population and
do not measure total household resources as accurately as expenditure surveys, often relying on income,
which, particularly for poor households, is less indicative of living standards in developing countries
than is consumption. Support for our finding that the OOP budget share typically increases with total
household consumption is provided by a study of India that is based on nationally representative
expenditure survey data (Peters et al., 2001).
The relationship between the OOP budget share and the size of the budget will be biased in a positive
direction, however, if health care is financed from savings, credit or the sale of assets rather than from
the sacrifice of current consumption. In that case, the total expenditure of households spending heavily
on health care will be temporarily raised above permanent income. They appear better-off than they
actually are.
Besides the endogeneity of total consumption, the tendency for the OOP budget share to rise with the
size of the household budget may reflect the fact that poor households devote the larger part of available
resources to covering subsistence expenses on food and shelter. The disruptive effect of OOP payments
on the living standards of the poor might be better assessed through their share of household resources
net of non-discretionary expenses. Definition of the latter is obviously problematic. Non-food
expenditures are an approximation (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 2003). The mean share of OOP
payments in household non-food expenditures is presented in the bottom part of Table III. The
differences between the OOP shares of total and of non-food expenditures are greater in the poorer
countries, reflecting the greater share of resources devoted to food. The OOP share remains highest in
Bangladesh, India and Vietnam, with 10.6–12.6% of non-food expenditures spent on health care. In
Kyrgyz and Nepal, both of which are very poor, the ratio of OOP payments to total expenditure is
relatively moderate but the OOP share of non-food expenditure is very high. The relative position of
China moves in the opposite direction, reflecting its higher level of income. The switch in denominator
results in a consistent fall in the value of concentration indices. This is to be expected given that the item
removed from the denominator – food – is a necessity. Six of the indices are now negative, indicating
that the OOP share of non-food expenditure falls as the level of non-food expenditure rises. This
relationship is particularly strong in China.
CATASTROPHIC PAYMENTS
Reliance on OOP financing leaves households exposed to the risk of incurring high medical expenses
should a household member fall ill. If the health care expenses were large relative to household
resources, the disruption to material living standards could be substantial and may be considered
catastrophic. Ideally, longitudinal data would be used to estimate the extent to which living standards
are seriously disrupted by the purchase of medical care in response to illness shocks. This would allow
one to identify how spending on non-medical goods and services changes following some health shock
(Gertler and Gruber, 2002). But appropriate panel data are not available for all countries included in
this study. An approximation to the disruptive effect of health expenditures on material living standards
must be made. We follow a number of authors in defining medical spending as ‘catastrophic’ if it
exceeds some fraction of total household resources (Berki, 1986; Wyszewianski, 1986; Wagstaff and Van
Doorslaer, 2003; Xu et al., 2003; Russell, 2004). The idea is that spending a large fraction of the
household budget on health care must be at the expense of consumption of other goods and services.
This opportunity cost may be incurred in the short term, if health care is financed by cutting back on
2See also unpublished reports cited by (Fabricant et al., 1999), that are also usually specific to one rural region.
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current consumption, or in the long-term, if it is financed through savings, the sale of assets or credit.3
The welfare loss from the sacrifice of current consumption will be greater. But long-term consequences
could also be severe. For example, if depleted savings or assets are not sufficient to meet subsequent
economic shocks, or if the household sinks into a spiral of debt. The health payments budget share
alone does not tell us what financing strategy has been adopted and therefore does not allow distinction
between short and long term effects.
Approximating the catastrophic economic consequences of illness through high health payments
budget shares has a number of limitations. First, it identifies only the households that incur
catastrophic medical expenditures and ignores those that cannot meet these expenses and so forgo
treatment. Through the subsequent deterioration of health, such households probably suffer a greater
loss of welfare than those incurring catastrophic payments. Recognising this, Pradhan and Prescott
(2002) attempt to estimate exposure to, rather than incurrence of, catastrophic payments. Second,
there is no distinction between types of medical care purchased. A wealthy household with the
capacity to spend a large fraction of its budget on cosmetic surgery would not usually be considered to
have experienced a catastrophe, but it would be considered catastrophic for a poor household to spend
the same fraction on essential medicines for a sick child. However, in low-income settings in particular,
little medical care consumption would be considered frivolous. Below, we present estimates of
catastrophic payments that differentially weight large health budget shares incurred by the rich and the
poor. Third, the choice of the threshold budget share above which health payments are considered
catastrophic is obviously subjective. A common choice has been 10% of total expenditure (Pradhan and
Prescott, 2002; Ranson, 2002; Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 2003); with the rationale that this
represents an approximate threshold at which the household is forced to sacrifice other basic needs, sell
productive assets, incur debt, or be impoverished (Russell, 2004). Here we consider a range of thresholds
defined with respect to both total consumption and non-food consumption. As argued above, use of
the latter might be more appropriate to assess the disruptive effect of OOP payments on the living
standards of the poor.4 Notwithstanding these limitations, most households that spend a substantial
fraction of their budget on health care can be expected to experience a disruption to their material living
standards. Such spending may therefore be used as a proxy to part of the catastrophic economic
consequences of illness.
In Table V, we present the catastrophic payment headcount (HC) – the percentage of households
incurring catastrophic payments (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 2003). Let Ti be OOP payments
of household i, xi be household consumption (total or non-food), z be the threshold budget share
and Ei be an indicator equal to 1 if Ti/xi>z and zero otherwise. Then, Hc ¼
Pn
i1 Ei=n
 
 100; where
n is the sample size. The headcount necessarily falls as the threshold is raised. For example, 28%
of Bangladeshi households spend in excess of 5% of the total household budget on health care
and a substantial 4.5% spend in excess of a quarter of the budget on health care.5 Changing
the threshold does not affect substantially the countries that have the highest/lowest incidence
of catastrophic payments (Figure 1). Catastrophic payments are most prevalent in Bangladesh,
3For evidence on strategies households adopt to finance medical expenditures see (Ensor and Pham, 1996; Sauerbron et al., 1996;
Wilkes et al., 1998; Peters et al., 2001; Skarbinski et al., 2002; van Damme, 2004; Bonu et al., 2005).
4Researchers at the World Health Organisation (Xu et al., 2003) set the threshold at 40% of capacity to pay, defined as non-
subsistence effective income. This is household expenditure net of the estimated cost of subsistence food needs. Subsistence
spending on food is defined as the average food expenditure of households in the 45th-50th percentile of the food budget share
distribution. Since the food budget share is declining with the total budget, this will roughly correspond to the food expenditure
of those with median welfare (taking food share a money metric indicator of utility). Actual food expenditure is used for those
spending less than this value. We prefer to avoid the problem of estimating subsistence food needs and keep the analysis more
transparent by referring to OOP as a share of total and of non-food expenditure.
5We have computed standard errors for all point estimates but do not give them in the tables. With large samples, the simple
parameters of interest are estimated with a high degree of precision. Presentation of standard errors would clutter the tables to
little advantage.
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Vietnam, China and India. Vietnam has a higher proportion of households than Bangladesh spending
in excess of 5% of the budget on health care but the ordering is reversed at all higher threshold
values. At the lower threshold value of 5%, Korea is close to Taiwan, with around 20% of households
spending in excess of this threshold. But at higher thresholds, Korea is closer to the high incidence
group and actually has a higher proportion of households than India, spending in excess of 15%
and even 25% of the budget. In fact, direct payments for health care absorb in excess of 25%
of total expenditure in a remarkable 2.5% of Korean households. This reflects the very extensive
use of co-payments, the non-coverage of many treatments and, in particular, the partial coverage
of expensive inpatient care provided by the Korean social insurance system. By contrast, in
Taiwan protection against very high OOP expenditures is similar to that in tax-financed Hong Kong.
The incidence of catastrophic payments is lowest in Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Indonesia
and the Philippines, with less than 5% of households spending more than 10% of total expenditures
on health care.
Table V also provides the catastrophic payments headcount defined at 15, 25 and 40% of non-food
expenditures. Bangladesh, China, India and Vietnam continue to have the highest incidence of
catastrophic payments. Comparing the headcounts defined at 25% of non-food expenditure with those
at 10% of total expenditure, which are broadly similar in magnitude on average, we see that there are
some significant re-rankings of the other countries (Figure 2). In particular, Kyrgyz and Nepal now join
the other low-income countries in having a high proportion of households spending in excess of 25% of
non-food expenditure. The degree of poverty in Kyrgyz and Nepal means that food absorbs a very large
share of the household budget and the share of total resources that can be devoted to health care is
limited. Once basic food needs have been met, health care accounts for a large fraction of the remaining
resources for a substantial fraction of the population. The high-income territories shift down the
ranking. Korea is no longer amongst the countries with the highest incidence and Taiwan now has the
Figure 1. Percentage of households incurring catastrophic payments – various thresholds for OOP
as % of total expenditure
HEALTH CARE IN ASIA 1173
Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Health Econ. 16: 1159–1184 (2007)
DOI: 10.1002/hec
second lowest incidence. The grouping of territories by prevalence remains constant irrespective of the
threshold of non-food expenditure share used.6
The incidence of catastrophic payments should be higher where health spending is larger as a
share of national income and there is greater reliance on OOP financing of health care. It will also
be increasing with the variance and the density of the right-hand tail of the OOP payments
distribution. Figure 3 confirms, as has been demonstrated previously (Xu et al., 2003), that countries
relying most on OOP financing generally have the greatest incidence of catastrophic payments.
Of course, reliance on OOP financing is negatively correlated with national income and so there is
a negative relationship between the incidence of catastrophic payments and national income. India
and Nepal appear to have a lower incidence, given their level of reliance on OOP financing, than
Bangladesh and Vietnam. In part, this is due to differences in the magnitude of health spending. The
mean health payments budget share is lower in Nepal than in both Vietnam and Bangladesh and is
lower in India than in Vietnam (Table V). The incidence is lower in India than in Bangladesh not
because mean spending is lower but because the OOP budget share distribution displays less variance
and right skewness (Table V). While China relies on OOP financing only slightly more than Indonesia,
the prevalence of catastrophic payments is much higher in China than Indonesia. This is due to
the greater propensity to spend on medicine in China (Table V). There is also some evidence that
social protection is effective in reducing exposure to catastrophic health payment risks in Indonesia
(Pradhan and Prescott, 2002).
Figure 2. Incidence of catastrophic payments defined relative to total and to non-food expenditures
6There are some apparent inconsistencies between our estimates of the catastrophic payment headcount at 40% of non-food
expenditure and those of Xu et al. (2003) at 40% of capacity to pay. The respective figures are as follows, with the Xu et al
estimates in parentheses: Bangladesh – 7.13% (1.21%); Indonesia – 1.95% (1.26%); South Korea – 1.85% (1.73%); Kyrgyz –
2.64% (0.62%); Philippines – 1.58% (0.78%); Sri Lanka – 1.31% (1.25%); Thailand – 0.71% (0.80%); Vietnam – 5.97%
(10.45%). Since Xu et al define capacity to pay as the smaller of estimated subsistence food needs and actual food expenditure,
our estimates should always be greater than theirs. Clearly this does not hold for Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, Thailand. Our
estimates of the headcount are, in a relative sense, much higher for Bangladesh and the Philippines.
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The correlation of catastrophic payments indicator (Ei) with household rank in the distribution of
living standards is reflected in the concentration indices (CE) presented in Table V (Wagstaff and Van
Doorslaer, 2003). A positive index means incidence is rising with household living standards. Using
total consumption as the measure of living standards and the reference for catastrophic payments,
incidence is generally increasing with living standards. The better-off are more likely to spend large
fractions of total consumption on health care. The strength of the correlation increases as the threshold
is raised. This is consistent with health care being a luxury good, although we should be careful in
placing an income elasticity interpretation on a bivariate relationship. Switching to non-food
consumption gives smaller concentration indices that are more often negative. This is to be expected
given food expenditures are a larger share of the budget of poorer households.
There is cross-country variation in the correlation between the incidence of catastrophic payments
and living standards that seems to be attributable to differences in national income, financing structure
and user charging policy. Figure 4 shows the concentration indices for the catastrophic headcount
defined at 10% of total consumption. In the higher-income countries, there is either no correlation or
the poor are more likely to incur catastrophic payments. Only in Taiwan are the poor more likely to
spend in excess of 15% of total expenditure on health care (Table V). Catastrophic payments are made
disproportionately by the better-off in Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Kyrgyz, Bangladesh
and Sri Lanka. In each of these countries, with the exception of Kyrgyz and to a lesser extent Malaysia,
the poor are exempted from public sector user charges where they exist (Table II). This is not the case in
China and Vietnam, where there is a high incidence of catastrophic payments that the poor are no less
likely to incur.
If one wishes to place a normative interpretation on catastrophic payments, then it may be considered
appropriate to give more weight to excess payments incurred by poorer households. Large expenditures
on health care that are incurred by better-off households at the cost of expendable consumption may be
judged quite differently from payments made by poor households that are forced to cut back on
consumption of basic necessities. A statistic that reflects not only the incidence but also the distribution
of catastrophic payments is computed by multiplying the catastrophic headcount by the complement of
Figure 3. Catastrophic headcount against OOP financing share (OOP>25% of non-food exp)
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its concentration index, HWC ¼ HC  1 CEð Þ (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 2003). This statistic is
equivalent to a weighted sum of a catastrophic payment indicator variable, Ei, with weights declining
linearly from 2 to 0 as one moves from the worst-off to the best-off household.7 If households exceeding
the threshold tend to be better-off, the concentration index CE will be positive, and H
W
C will be less than
HC. This is generally the case, with the opposite arising consistently only in Taiwan and, occasionally,
depending on the threshold, in China, South Korea and Vietnam (Table V). But the difference between the
weighted and unweighted indices is generally modest (Figure 5). Taking account of the distribution has
relatively little impact on the cross-country picture. Given the high concentration of catastrophic payments
on the better-off in Bangladesh, its weighted incidence moves down relative to that of China and Vietnam.
The headcount gives the incidence and not the intensity of catastrophic payments. Intensity may be
measured by the payment in excess of the threshold averaged over all households exceeding the
threshold – the mean positive overshoot (MPO) (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 2003). Define a
household’s excess payment, or threshold overshoot, by Oi ¼ EiððTi=xiÞ  zÞ: Then, MPO ¼
Pn
i¼1Oi=Pn
i¼1 Ei: Both the prevalence and intensity of catastrophic payments are reflected in the mean
catastrophic payment overshoot (O) – payments in excess of the threshold average over all households.
We can write O ¼ Hc MPO; making clear that the mean overshoot is increasing with both the
incidence and the intensity of catastrophic payments.
Since the majority do not incur catastrophic payments, the mean overshoot (O) is dominated by the
incidence. It is not surprising, therefore, that the overshoot statistics presented in Figure 6 display the
same general pattern across countries as the headcount statistics (see also Table VI). There are,
however, a few notable exceptions. Defining catastrophic payments at 25% of non-food expenditure,
Nepal has the highest mean overshoot (Figure 6), although it had only the fifth highest incidence
(Figure 2), implying a very high intensity of catastrophic payments. Amongst those spending more than
Figure 4. Concentration indices for catastrophic headcount (OOP>10% total exp)
7Such weighting obviously introduces normative judgements with respect to relative societal tolerance of catastrophic payments
incurred at different points in the income distribution. This is inevitable in any attempt to summarise both the level and the
distribution of some variable in one statistic. Without wishing to claim that the specific weighting scheme adopted reflects a social
consensus, we suggest that the majority would wish to place more weight on catastrophic payments incurred by poorer
households.
E. VAN DOORSLAER ET AL.1176
Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Health Econ. 16: 1159–1184 (2007)
DOI: 10.1002/hec
25% of total non-food expenditure on OOP payments in Nepal, the average OOP share exceeds this
threshold by 34 percentage points (Table VI), giving a staggering 59% OOP budget share. In
Bangladesh, the average budget share for those exceeding the 25% of non-food expenditure threshold is
44% and among the equivalent ‘overshooters’ in Taiwan, it is 37%. But only 1.5% of households exceed
the threshold in Taiwan, compared with almost 15% in Bangladesh. The much lower cross-country
variability in the intensity of catastrophic payments than in the prevalence reflects the fact that, given
other needs, there is an upper limit on the proportion of household resources that can be devoted to
medical expenditures. Concentration indices for ‘excess’ health payments generally display similar
patterns to the corresponding indices for the incidence.
Figure 5. Distribution weighted and unweighted incidence of catastrophic payments (OOP>10% total exp)
Figure 6. Mean catastrophic overshoot
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Table VI. OOP health payments in excess of catastrophic payments threshold budget share
Share of total
consumption/expenditure
Share of non-food
consumption/expenditure
Threshold 5% 10% 15% 25% 15% 25% 40%
BANGLADESH Mean overshoot (O) 3.04% 2.02% 1.40% 0.72% 4.74% 2.83% 1.26%
Concentration index (CO) 0.3299 0.3915 0.4528 0.567 0.3844 0.4667 0.592
Rank weighted overshoot (OW) 2.04% 1.23% 0.76% 0.31% 2.92% 1.51% 0.51%
Mean positive overshoot (MPO) 11.01% 12.98% 14.15% 16.07% 19.32% 19.22% 17.70%
CHINA Mean overshoot (O) 2.22% 1.28% 0.81% 0.35% 3.39% 1.86% 0.73%
Concentration index (CO) 0.0639 0.1056 0.1631 0.2594 0.0697 0.0265 0.0653
Rank weighted overshoot (OW) 2.08% 1.14% 0.68% 0.26% 3.62% 1.91% 0.69%
Mean positive overshoot (MPO) 7.84% 10.12% 11.52% 12.38% 16.09% 16.57% 15.24%
HONG KONG Mean overshoot (O) 0.98% 0.55% 0.34% 0.13% 0.73% 0.34% 0.11%
Concentration index (CO) 0.0854 0.1410 0.2052 0.3140 0.0237 0.0762 0.1719
Rank weighted overshoot (OW) 0.90% 0.47% 0.27% 0.09% 0.71% 0.31% 0.09%
Mean positive overshoot (MPO) 7.56% 9.40% 11.08% 12.06% 12.40% 13.66% 12.76%
INDIA Mean overshoot (O) 1.77% 0.92% 0.53% 0.20% 2.80% 1.35% 0.45%
Concentration index (CO) 0.1449 0.2080 0.2788 0.4144 0.1609 0.2451 0.3915
Rank weighted overshoot (WO) 1.51% 0.73% 0.38% 0.12% 2.35% 1.02% 0.27%
Mean positive overshoot (MPO) 6.91% 8.49% 9.65% 11.03% 13.39% 13.83% 12.96%
INDONESIA Mean overshoot (O) 0.83% 0.51% 0.34% 0.17% 1.38% 0.77% 0.32%
Concentration index (CO) 0.3125 0.4208 0.5069 0.6367 0.2688 0.3770 0.5391
Rank weighted overshoot (OW) 0.57% 0.29% 0.17% 0.06% 1.01% 0.48% 0.15%
Mean positive overshoot (MPO) 8.71% 11.48% 13.09% 14.64% 16.68% 17.62% 16.64%
KOREA Mean overshoot (O) 1.90% 1.16% 0.76% 0.36% 1.42% 0.73% 0.27%
Concentration index (CO) 0.0325 0.0778 0.1263 0.2302 0.0233 0.0916 0.2073
Rank weighted overshoot (OW) 1.84% 1.07% 0.67% 0.28% 1.39% 0.66% 0.22%
Mean positive overshoot (MPO) 9.07% 11.23% 12.48% 13.94% 14.52% 15.20% 14.82%
KYRGYZ REP. Mean overshoot (O) 0.84% 0.35% 0.15% 0.04% 2.38% 1.06% 0.28%
Concentration index (CO) 0.1224 0.1938 0.2039 0.2830 0.0851 0.1120 0.1192
Rank weighted overshoot (OW) 0.74% 0.28% 0.12% 0.03% 2.18% 0.94% 0.25%
Mean positive overshoot (MPO) 5.44% 6.02% 6.71% 7.46% 13.19% 11.44% 10.70%
MALAYSIA Mean overshoot (O) 0.36% 0.17% 0.10% 0.05% 0.24% 0.10% 0.03%
Concentration index (CO) 0.2542 0.4204 0.5370 0.7232 0.2641 0.4730 0.7388
Rank weighted overshoot (OW) 0.27% 0.10% 0.05% 0.01% 0.18% 0.05% 0.01%
Mean positive overshoot (MPO) 5.39% 8.58% 10.58% 13.15% 9.62% 12.46% 14.82%
NEPAL Mean overshoot (O) 1.11% 0.64% 0.43% 0.24% 4.35% 3.11% 2.15%
Concentration index (CO) 0.0579 0.0474 0.0475 0.0418 0.2368 0.2949 0.3695
Rank weighted overshoot (OW) 1.06% 0.61% 0.41% 0.25% 5.38% 4.02% 2.94%
Mean positive overshoot (MPO) 7.54% 10.85% 13.88% 20.59% 25.42% 33.66% 47.15%
PHILIPPINES Mean overshoot (O) 0.82% 0.50% 0.32% 0.14% 1.15% 0.62% 0.24%
Concentration index (CO) 0.2766 0.3427 0.4089 0.5429 0.2055 0.2674 0.3819
Rank weighted overshoot (OW) 0.60% 0.33% 0.19% 0.07% 0.91% 0.46% 0.15%
Mean positive overshoot (MPO) 8.94% 10.81% 12.01% 12.68% 15.89% 16.36% 15.36%
SRI LANKA Mean overshoot (O) 0.56% 0.27% 0.16% 0.07% 0.97% 0.42% 0.15%
Concentration index (CO) 0.2969 0.4412 0.5553 0.7575 0.1064 0.2376 0.4258
Rank weighted overshoot (OW) 0.39% 0.15% 0.07% 0.02% 0.87% 0.32% 0.08%
Mean positive overshoot (MPO) 5.09% 8.89% 10.41% 15.56% 10.74% 13.70% 15.05%
TAIWAN Mean overshoot (O) 1.03% 0.47% 0.26% 0.10% 0.45% 0.18% 0.06%
Concentration index (CO) 0.0293 0.0457 0.0528 0.0421 0.0442 0.0430 0.0088
Rank weighted overshoot (OW) 1.06% 0.50% 0.28% 0.11% 0.47% 0.19% 0.06%
Mean positive overshoot (MPO) 5.40% 7.46% 9.39% 11.79% 9.97% 12.07% 14.04%
THAILAND Mean overshoot (O) 0.61% 0.33% 0.20% 0.07% 0.55% 0.26% 0.08%
Concentration index (CO) 0.2474 0.3337 0.3907 0.5349 0.1508 0.1970 0.2172
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CONCLUSION
There is still heavy reliance on out-of-pocket financing of health care in Asia. The OOP share of health
funding is at least a third in all territories included in this study, exceeds three-fifths in Bangladesh and
China and over three quarters in Vietnam, India and Nepal. This paper has substantially increased the
comparative evidence on the magnitude, the distribution and the economic consequences of OOP
payments for health care in Asia. It will facilitate more informed discussion of health care financing
across the continent. The main findings are as follows. First, heavy reliance on OOP financing appears to
have important consequences for household living standards. For example, OOP payments for health
care absorb more than one quarter of household resources net of food costs in at least 10% of all
households in Bangladesh, China, India, Nepal and Vietnam. Such levels of spending can only be
accommodated through the diversion of considerable resources from current consumption and/or
through the accumulation of debt or the exhaustion of savings and assets with long-term consequences
for household welfare. Second, there are important differences across countries in the incidence of
catastrophic health payments. It is generally higher in low-income countries that rely more on OOP
financing and lower in high/middle-income countries that make greater use of prepayment mechanisms.
But there is also substantial variation at similar levels of national income. Third, the distribution of
catastrophic payments also differs across countries. In high-income countries, they tend to be evenly
distributed, or even slightly concentrated on the less well-off. In most low-income countries, however, it
is households with higher total expenditure that are more likely to spend a large fraction of those
resources on health care. This may reflect the inability of the poorest of the poor to divert resources from
other basic needs and possibly the protection of the poor from user charges offered in some countries.
But in China, Kyrgyz and Vietnam, where there were no exemptions of the poor from charges at the time
of the surveys analysed, the poor were as likely, or even more likely, to incur catastrophic payments.
It is not surprising that catastrophic payments are generally more pervasive in low-income countries
financing health care principally by direct payments and less pervasive in high-income countries with more
developed prepayment methods of finance. But the analysis reveals interesting differences within each of
these two groups. Malaysia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand have managed to contain the OOP
health financing share below that found in most low and middle income countries and all have a relatively
low incidence of catastrophic payments. Bangladesh, China, India, Nepal and Vietnam stand out in relying
heavily on OOP financing and having a high incidence of catastrophic payments. While the second group of
countries is, in general, poorer, there is little difference between the average incomes of China and Sri
Lanka. The latter is striking as a low-income country that manages to rely on OOP payments for just less
than half of health financing and still further because the catastrophic impact of these payments are modest.
This reflects the near absence of charges in the public sector. The majority of OOP payments are made by
Table VI. Continued
Share of total
consumption/expenditure
Share of non-food
consumption/expenditure
Threshold 5% 10% 15% 25% 15% 25% 40%
Rank weighted overshoot (OW) 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.47% 0.21% 0.06%
Mean positive overshoot (MPO) 7.25% 9.39% 10.41% 9.05% 12.22% 14.22% 11.13%
VIETNAM Mean overshoot (O) 2.53% 1.39% 0.81% 0.30% 4.35% 2.24% 0.76%
Concentration index (CO) 0.0960 0.1845 0.2821 0.4594 0.0681 0.0197 0.0809
Rank weighted overshoot (OW) 2.28% 1.13% 0.58% 0.16% 4.65% 2.28% 0.69%
Mean positive overshoot (MPO) 7.48% 9.18% 9.58% 10.46% 14.81% 14.83% 12.66%
Notes:Definitions of mean overshoot and mean positive overshoot provided in text. Concentration index is for the household level
overshoot, Oi. Rank weighted overshoot is equal to O ð1 COÞ:
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the better-off for private alternatives to public care. Indonesia relies on OOP financing only slightly less
than China but has much smaller catastrophic impact of health payments. In part, this may be due to
targeted exemptions in Indonesia, implemented through a health card, that have had some success
in shielding poor families from high health payments (Pradhan and Prescott, 2002). The lack of such a
scheme in China not only results in a greater prevalence of catastrophic payments but also in a greater
concentration of OOP payments on low-income households. But the low incidence of catastrophic
payments in Indonesia also reflects the low propensity to spend on health care.8 Thailand has been even
more successful than Sri Lanka in constraining the living standards consequences of OOP health payments.
Its more developed economy with a larger formal sector allows a greater share of health funding to be
raised from taxes. In addition, an effective health card system has protected the poor from charges and
the introduction of universal coverage, with a flat rate minimal charge, has further weakened the impact
of OOP payments on household budgets. In Malaysia, charges for public sector care have been kept
low and catastrophic payments largely avoided. Among the three high-income territories, the incidence
of catastrophic payments is much higher in Korea than in Hong Kong and Taiwan due to the substantial
co-payments within the Korean social insurance system and, particularly, the partial coverage of
inpatient care.
While this study significantly expands the available evidence on the living standards consequences of
OOP payments for health care in Asia, it provides only a partial picture of a multifaceted problem.
Besides the occurrence of catastrophic payments, lack of insurance against health care expenses imposes
other costs on household welfare that should be examined in complementary analyses. First, households
may be impoverished by health payments. We have addressed this issue for the low/middle income
countries included in the study elsewhere (Van Doorslaer et al., 2006). Second, OOP payments raise the
price barrier to the quantity and quality of care consumed. As noted above, poor households may not
be observed to incur catastrophic payments since they cannot afford to divert spending from subsistence
food needs. The flip side of catastrophic payments is the catastrophic loss of health and subsequent
erosion of earnings capacity due to inability to afford health care. It is therefore important to
complement the study of health care payments with that of health care utilization (O’Donnell O et al.,
2007). In addition to medical spending, illness shocks have catastrophic economic consequences
through lost earnings. In fact, Gertler and Gruber (2002) find earnings losses to have a more disrupting
effect on household living standards than medical spending following a health shock in Indonesia. The
lack of sickness and disability insurance may impose an even greater welfare loss than that of health
care insurance.
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APPENDIX A
The description of surveys is given in Table AI.
8 In 2000, total expenditure on health was only 2.7% of GDP in Indonesia, compared, for example, with 5.3% in China (World
Health Report, 2002).
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